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1 Introduction
Four armed rebellions,1 combined with droughts
in 19732 and 1984, have adversely affected Mali’s
socioeconomic development. The Tuareg rebellion
started in the 1960s and gained momentum in the
1990s. The rebellions took the form of mobile
commandos targeting paramilitary forces such as
the gendarmerie,3 police, and the armed forces.
Nomadic communities living in Northern Mali
have been particularly impacted by the effects.
These include the mass exodus of young people,
illiteracy, fragile democratic achievements, and
the political exploitation of intracommunity
tensions. These are exacerbated by environmental
factors, including the lack of rainfall and spread of
the Sahara desert, degradation of the water table
and decreasing cattle numbers. Insecurity has
resulted in the absence of rule of law, in which, in
addition to armed rebellions, trafficking in drugs,
vehicles, weapons and cigarettes thrive. Further,
the Sahel is turning into a launching pad for
international terrorism, especially for Al Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
This study explores the causes and consequences
of these developments from a sociological
perspective. It elaborates on the three security
threats (rebellions, trafficking, and terrorism),
which affect the region, and provides a typology
of criminal networks and existing terrorist
groups, emphasising their interconnectedness
and focusing on the impact of criminal activities
and terrorist threats on local communities. The
study also analyses the role of state and
international actors in managing the crisis.
Further, it addresses the role of non-state actors
(local communities, non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and other social
movements). It highlights the contribution of
local community leaders (mainly customary
chiefs and chefs de fractions),4 through the
deployment of traditional mechanisms for
conflict resolution, and the implementation of an
alternative, networked, approach to security. 
1.1 The strategic context of Northern Mali
1.1.1 Geography and sociology of Northern Mali
Northern Mali is made up of three regions,
whose inhabitants make up 10 per cent of the
national population: Timbuktu (681,691
inhabitants), Gao (544,120 inhabitants) and
Kidal (67,638 inhabitants) (2009 population
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census). Malian communities living in the north
of the country are nomadic: Tuaregs (1.7 per cent
of the national population); Arabs, including
Moors and Kountas (1.2 per cent of the national
population); Peuls, nomadic pastoralists (data
unavailable); and the Sonrhaïs or Songhoys,5 who
live in fixed settlements (7.2 per cent).6 The
Sonrhaïs are the largest community in the
Timbuktu and Gao regions, followed by the
Tuaregs, also called ‘blue people’ due to the
colour of their clothing, who are predominant in
the Kidal region. They can also be found in
Ménaka and Bourème in the Gao region and
around Timbuktu. Arabs are mainly found in
Timbuktu, Bourème and Kidal. The Kountas
inhabit the Telemsi valley, between Gao and
Kidal. The nomadic Peuls are scattered around
these three regions. 
The Tuaregs, Arabs/Moors and Peuls share
relatively similar physical traits (tall, slim, and
generally fair), and differ from the black African
features of Songhaï populations. The social
organisation of these three communities is also
very similar (highly hierarchical, caste-based,
where authority is based on Islamic chieftaincy). 
Despite sharing a common language, the Tuareg
are not a homogenous group. They are divided
into a number of sub-groups who live in different
territorial entities. Social organisation among
Tuaregs is highly hierarchical and sketchy
(Bourgeot 1995). Social stratification is vertical,
comprising: the noble class (Imajaggan), warrior
tribes such as Ifoghas and Kel Haggar, merchant
tribes, religious and intellectual elites (Ineslemen),
vassal tribes (Imrad), artisans (Inaden, who are
mainly blacksmiths), former Tuareg prisoners
(Irawellan), freed slaves (Iklan) and slaves. Tuareg
society is organised around powerful symbols such
the war drum (ettabel), which symbolises power.
The power holder, who bears the title of
Amanukal, is the military leader, chosen by a
deliberative assembly, made up of representatives
of the most powerful families of dominant tribes
(Tawshit). The Amanukal stands as supreme chief
of the confederation of Tuareg tribes living within
the premises of its political authority (Tisaradh).
The Amanukal is a traditional chieftaincy with a
matrilineal form of succession (Sidibé 2006).
Tuaregs practice a liberal form of Islam, and
power is based on social prestige and charisma
(warrior virtues are highly regarded in Tuareg
society), hence its secular essence. 
Malian Arabs are made up of the Kounta, the
Barabich, the Gouanin, the Shamba and the
Rguiba (Moors). The Qabila (tribes) are mainly
descendents of a common ancestry, which is the
basis of its hierarchical social organisation. This
is also the case among Moors such as the
warriors (Hassan), religious elites (Zawaya), and
tributaries (Znaga). Life is principally dominated
by Islam. The Kounta are the leaders of the
traditional chieftaincy and their power is
essentially religious (some regard them as
descendents of Prophet Mohammed).
The social organisation of the Peuls is hierarchical
and complex. At the top the noble class are the
Duroob (nomads) and the Jaawambe (advisors and
assistants). The intermediary class is made up of
artisans: Yneebè (caste-based artisans), wayilbe
Baylo (blacksmiths), Lawbe, Labbo (carpenters),
Sakkebe, Sakke (cobblers) and the Griot classes
(Mabube and Mabo). The Wambabe and Banbado are
adulators, musicians, and guardians of traditions.
At the bottom of the pyramid are domestic
servants (Maccube, Maccudo or Kordo). The supreme
chief is elected by tribe leaders. 
The Sonrhaïs or Songhaïs are both black and fair
skinned, and principally thrive on agriculture
and cattle rearing. Boubacar Séga Diallo
describes it as hierarchical and conflictual, and
divided into three groups: the Sorko Sonrhai
(fishermen who are regarded as masters of the
seas), the Do ou Gabibi (farmers and cattle
farmers, whom are regarded as masters of the
earth), and the Gow (hunters). These groups
entertain conflicting relationships (Diallo 2007).
In Sonrhaï society, the Askia are the ruling class.
The noble class is made up of Zarma (the
nobility) and Marabouts (holders of religious
authority). Castes are composed of the Sorko Fono
and Sorko Faran (fishermen, a sub-group of the
Sorko Sonrhai). The bottom of the social ladder is
made up of servants (tyindikata and gabibi,
farming slaves; and the arbi and zanji,
descendants of slaves). The Sonrhaïs have
various symbols of power: the seal, the Koran,
the turban, the green skullcap, the 12 banners,
and the drum. The holder of political power
bears the title of Askia. This power is essentially
secular (Durand 1982: 227). 
The relations between these four communities
have long been characterised by conflict and
rivalry. Before colonisation, intercommunity
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violence in Northern Mali consisted mainly of
Tuareg raids on other communities and caravans
of traders. Furthermore, clashes between
nomadic populations (Arabs/Tuareg,
Tuareg/Peuls) on the one hand, and with farming
populations on the other, were frequent.
Conflictual historical relations between ‘white’
populations (Tuaregs and Arabs) and black
populations (farming communities) stem from
superiority and/or inferiority complexes: white
populations saw themselves as superior to their
black counterparts. It is in this context that the
latter (black populations), who saw themselves as
legitimate owners of the land, took up arms
against Tuareg and Arab communities. This led
to deadly clashes as recently as 1995 (during the
third Tuareg rebellion). 
After colonisation, powerful Tuareg tribes such as
the Ifoghas continued to wage war against other
Tuareg tribes, and against Arab groups. Conflicts
with the latter group pertained to control of the
trans-Saharan trade. Frequent rivalries are also
noted between Rguibat Arabs and Kounta Arabs.
Again, this rivalry continues to be played out in
the modern context of drug trafficking: Arab
groups of Tilemsi kidnapped a Kounta chief,
Baba Ould Sidi El Moctar, at Anefis in the Kidal
region in January 2010, mainly in response to the
capture of one of their drug cargos by the Ifoghas
and the Kountas. He was subsequently released
thanks to the intervention of Mali’s president,
Amadou Toumani Touré. Tensions between
Tuaregs and Peuls, relating to cattle theft and
grazing land, have led to several assassinations.
Cattle farmers, the Peuls, and merchant Arabs
accuse the Tuaregs of stealing cattle and
behaving as if they are absolute masters of the
northern territories. 
Despite these conflicts, however, there are also
instances of genuine intercommunity alliances,
which are generally based on marriages and
intercommunity cousinage, especially between
the Tuaregs and Arabs. For instance, the
Kountas are the traditional allies of Ifoghas
Tuaregs of Kidal. They both claim to descend
from the Prophet Mohammed. 
2 Security threats
The Sahel has become the sanctuary of choice for
criminal networks and terrorist groups searching
for bases from which they can secure financing
and plan attacks. Networks of traffickers thrive,
partly because the region’s vast and mountainous
desert area is conducive to illicit activity.
2.1 Criminal and terrorist networks 
2.1.1 Trafficking: arms, drugs, cigarettes, and vehicles
In the north of the Sahel, arms traffickers favour
several routes: in the Kidal region, the Kidal-Tin-
Essako axis and the Tamassina valley-Tedjerert
border with Algeria and Niger is popular; in the
Timbuktu region arms are supplied through the
Timbuktu border with Mauritania (Polisario axis). 
Florquin and Pézard (2005:72) state that 
Over the years the networks have been
enriched, and affect other countries in the
region (including the Mano River [countries
on the West African coast]). To date, several
routes are still used and contribute to the
ongoing proliferation of arms in the north.
Local networks are linked to regional and
international counterparts. For instance, Gèze
and Mellah (2007) argue that the group, Groupe
Islamique pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC –
Movement for Islamic preaching and combat)
most likely bought weapons from Tuaregs in
neighbouring countries.
More than 81,000 Kalashnikovs are estimated to
be circulating in the Sahel. M16s used in the
Chad conflict (2005–2010) were found in
Mauritania; Beretta AR-70s used in the
Lebanese civil war were seized when Algerian
rebel groups operating in the border regions of
Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger were
captured. Small arms circulating in the Sahel
include Israeli submachine guns, revolvers,
automatic pistols, semi-automatic hunting rifles,
assault rifles, heavy machine guns, mortars, hand
grenades, grenade launchers, anti-air canons,
anti-tank canons, and missile launchers (Izddine,
cited in Hamadouch 2008). Almost every
inhabitant carries a small arm.7 Armed robbery
is common and populations use weapons to settle
intercommunity disputes. 
A transnational network of drugs trafficking is
also well-established in Northern Mali. Some
argue that tribal groups play a central role: ‘No
trafficking takes place without the association of
local tribal groups. People involved in trafficking
are therefore known by a good part of the
population’ (Antil 2010). For instance, there is a
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district of Gao called ‘the cocaine district’,
referring to its residents. Some big villas on the
main road leading to Kidal airport belong to well-
known drugs and cigarette traffickers. Residents
can even identify the villas by their owners’ area
of trafficking (drugs, cigarettes or arms). Some
complicity exists between the traffickers and
certain populations (for instance young
tribesmen with knowledge of the desert are used
as drivers and guides). Some local state officials
and civil servants are also ‘actively complicit’.
Members of the Kounta Arab communities, who
control most trans-Saharan trade, are perceived
to be the main actors in the drug trade. 
Several other transnational actors are involved in
drugs trafficking, especially the Sahraouis of the
Polisario Front, Mauritanian ‘businessmen’
belonging to the Rguiba and Smacid tribes
(influential and respected traders in
Mauritania), elements of Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Algerians, Moroccans,
and other international networks.8 Connections
stretch to both the Moroccan mafia and
Lebanese businessmen in the Canary Islands and
in mainland Spain, as well as Galicians (Peduzzi
2010). The drug trafficking networks are
organised such that one team in Northern Mali
receives the merchandise from Latin America,
and another team takes it on to Europe. Some of
the regular armed forces and northern state
officials are complicit. 
Other trafficked goods are cigarettes and cars.
Cigarette brands such as Marlboro, Gauloises,
Legend and Gold Seal are sold at half the market
price and flood Mali’s main cities, including
Bamako, Sikasso, Ségou and Kayes. Mauritania’s
capital Nouakchott is the main destination for
luxury cars, particularly, from Europe and via
Morocco. The Nouakchott- Nema-Timbuktu-
Kidal route is the most used by mafia networks. 
2.1.2 Islamic terrorism
In September 2006, four Islamist groups from
the Sahel region, the Algerian Salafist Group for
Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la
Prédication et le Combat – GSPC), the Moroccan
Islamic Combatant Group (Groupe Islamique
Combattant au Maroc – GICM), the Libyan Islamic
Combatant Group (Groupe Islamique Combattant
Libyen – GICL) and the Tunisian Islamic
Combatant Group (Groupe Islamique Combattant en
Tunisie – GICT), along with other small Islamic
groups from countries such as Mauritania, Mali
and Niger, built an alliance with Al Qaeda. They
subsequently renamed themselves Al Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and established a
central command unit, with a view to their scope
for action. 
From supplying fighters to hotspots such as Iraq,
Palestine and Afghanistan between 2004 and
2006, Islamic groups in the Maghreb became a
united Salafist movement (Guidère 2008). The
Sahel provides cover to train Jihadists from
neighbouring countries and beyond. AQIM has
taken advantage of the lack of state presence in
the region to establish operations in various
countries. Its operation covers thousands of
kilometres from eastern Algeria to Mauritania’s
border with Senegal. The movement is currently
made up of 200 to 800 highly mobile fighters.
AQIM mainly recruits from amongst the
Tuaregs, Arabs, and Moors because of their
excellent knowledge of the desert. However, sub-
Saharan Africans are also among the fighters. 
Elements of AQIM have become increasingly
present in cities of Northern Mali. However,
according to a community leader who took part
in the first negotiations to free Austrian
hostages, there are also young people from the
southern part of Mali among AQIM’s fighters: 
Surprised to see these young people among
the terrorists, I enquired from one of them
about their motivations for joining such a
group. He pointed out that God has no colour
and that it was more a matter of religious
conviction’ (interview, Bamako, 27 June 2011). 
Religious indoctrination is widely practised in
the south, and the radical Jihadist doctrine can
appeal to unemployed young people. 
These terrorist groups use various forms of
trafficking to acquire vehicles, weapons, and
effective means of communication. The
transformation of the Sahara into a cocaine
highway from Latin America allows AQIM to
levy a tax on merchandise destined for Western
countries. However, kidnappings of Western
nationals have also become an important source
of revenue. Sahelian Islamist groups have
kidnapped and demanded ransoms for 30 people
since 2003 (African Union 2010). In 2003, 32
European tourists were kidnapped near Illizi,
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Algeria, separated into two groups, and
subsequently released in two phases. The first
group was released on 13 May 2003, following a
successful mission carried out by the Algerian
army. The second group crossed the Sahara from
West to East until the former Malian rebel
leader Iyad Ag Aghali9 and the Malian
authorities negotiated their release on 18 August
2003, after a ransom of about €4.6 million was
paid (Bentaous 2004). An estimated 90 per cent
of AQIM resources emanate from ransoms
(reportedly US$50 million) (El Watan 2010).
2.1.3 The Tuareg rebellion
The link established between the Tuareg
rebellion and Islamic terrorism is more a matter
of perception than evidence. The Tuareg
rebellion started in the 1960s and effectively
developed during the 1990s. The different waves
of Tuareg rebellion pertain to the
marginalisation of Tuareg and Arab nomadic
communities. Successive Malian regimes dealt
with the rebellions in different ways: between
1962 and 1964, the government of Modibo Keita
militarily suppressed the rebellion. In 1990, the
regime of General Moussa Traore also refused to
negotiate with rebels, accusing them of being
armed bandits. 
However, the authorities which presided over the
democratic transition of 1991 chose to recognise
rebel movements. The Comité de Transition pour le
Salut du Peuple (CTSP) started negotiations with
the rebellion under the auspices of Algerian
mediation in order to find a political solution to
the issue.
This individual initiative by the president of the
CTSP, Amadou Toumani Touré, was followed up
by a technical steering group led by Baba Hakhib
Haïdara, an influential person in Malian politics
from Timbuktu, representing the northern
regions. The report by two influential mediators,
Mauritanian Ahmed Baba Miské and the French
national Edgar Pisani,10 called for a deeper
analysis of the situation in order to restore
peace, and pointed to a number of obstacles to
overcome. Former President Alpha Oumar
Konaré, who won the 1992 elections, carried on
with negotiations, leading to a peace treaty in
1996 (Pacte national), between the government
and rebels. The search for a national solution led
to the integration of former fighters into
different branches of the army. 
The treaty was also supposed to lay the
foundations for Northern Mali’s socioeconomic
development (decentralisation, turning Kidal
into a region, and the introduction of
development projects and programmes). The
Alliance Démocratique du 23 mai pour le Changement
(ADC), led by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga brought the
Tuareg issue back to the forefront of national
debate in 2006. Following a long period of peace,
some Tuareg officers attacked units of the
national army in Kidal and Ménaka and made
away with weapons and ammunition. They then
declared a new rebellion against the government
of Mali, which they accused of breaching the
terms of the 1996 treaty. 
This recurrence of the crisis can be explained by
the persistent lack of development in the region,
as well as weak state presence, especially in
Kidal. Further, the Tuareg issue has always been
exploited by neighbouring countries, such as
Algeria and Libya under Qadafi. In fact, the
Tuareg rebellion has always been played out in a
context of regional rivalry and interference by
Algeria and Libya. Most recently this
encompasses regional positioning in the fight
against terrorism in the Sahel, with each actor
seeking to make themselves appear pivotal in the
fight against AQIM. 
Libya under Colonel Qadafi long encouraged
Tuaregs to claim their autonomy. Elements of the
1990s rebellion were former fighters from the
Libyan Islamic legion who fought in Chad,
Palestine, Lebanon, and Nicaragua, returning with
weapons and ammunition.11 Many rightly feared a
resurgence of the Tuareg rebellion following
turmoil in Libya: young Tuaregs were recruited to
fight alongside forces loyal to Qadafi. However, the
intensity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) strikes forced many of these mercenaries
back to Northern Mali, armed with weapons and
ammunition. Qadafi played a key role in the
resolution of the Tuareg issue, thus his death is
likely to change the strategic context of the Sahel
in a fundamental way.
Algeria has also always played an influential role
in the Tuareg rebel movements, using them to
fight against GSPC groups in the Sahel. Deadly
fighting took place, for instance, between
elements of the ADC and AQIM in Northern
Mali. This led to the death of three main AQIM
leaders, including El Para.12 According to reliable
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sources, this operation sought to reassure both
Algerian authorities and international opinion
that the Alliance had nothing to do with the
Salafist movement. Many former rebels offered
their services to fight against AQIM and to join a
proposed specialised unit (unite special méhariste)
which is supposed to maintain security in
Northern Mali. 
Furthermore, some leaders of the Tuareg
rebellion are known to work for the Algerian
secret services. This includes Deyti Ag Sidimo,
an Arab from Tessalit. Despite his role, he also
managed to become a special agent for the
Libyans, which allowed him to be the interface
between Tripoli and mercenaries from sub-
Saharan Africa (Niangaly 2011). Algerian
support for the Tuareg is to be situated within
the context of rivalry with Libya. Algeria saw the
establishment of a Libyan Consulate in Kidal as
a plot between Mali and Libya, which would
allow the latter to spy on them from Mali.
Algeria had always been the interlocutor by
default in the Tuareg issue, both in Mali and
Niger. As such, its leaders did not take well to the
Malian government’s move to use a Libyan
representative to instigate talks with ADC leader
Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, who found exile in Tripoli. 
2.1.4 Three interwoven threats in the Sahel 
The three security threats described above feed
into each other through a web of well-
established connections. There is a strategic
alliance between trafficking networks and
terrorist groups which emanates from
convergent interests: criminal networks benefit
from violent actions perpetrated by terrorist
and/or rebel groups, while the latter take
advantage of the financing derived from criminal
activities (Ammour 2009). AQIM terrorist
groups use drug traffickers to obtain weapons,
ammunition, 4x4 vehicles and communication
tools (GPS and satellite phones) to carry out
their activities. In order to remain elusive,
elements of AQIM hand over the money received
from ransoms to drugs traffickers who use it in
their own activities. Fifty per cent of the profits
generated from drug trafficking are paid back to
AQIM in kind.13 In turn, AQIM provides security
to drug convoys in the Sahel in return for
substantial sums of money.14 This mutually
beneficial connection was established after a
round of cautious observation between these two
criminal networks. In this regard, a well-
informed observer speaks of ‘hybridisation’ to
point out this convergence of interests between
criminal networks and terrorist groups
(interview, Bamako, 23 June 2011). 
Independent groups of armed men also abduct
Western nationals and ‘sell’ them on to AQIM –
a form of subcontracting. In June 2010 the Niger
army clashed with a group of armed bandits on
board three 4x4 vehicles, 80km to the north of
Arlit (an area rich in minerals, mainly exploited
by the French company Areva). They seized 640
explosives, 435 detonators, and US$90,000 left
behind (Issa 2011). 
3 State actors and security threats
The presence of criminal and terrorist groups in
the north illustrates the difficulties the Malian
state faces in exercising effective political control
over its national territory. The availability of
weapons in the area, the pursuit of easy money,
the lack of an effective regional economic
strategy and high youth unemployment only
serve to fuel rebellions and undermine peace
building. The illicit trans-Saharan trade and
general criminality has forced Malian authorities
to adopt an anti-terrorism/criminality policy in
order to create an enabling environment for the
sustainable development of these regions. The
securitisation of the north is considered a
categorical imperative. Mali’s international
partners are also involved in this fight. 
3.1 State responses 
The Malian government believes securitisation
can only be achieved by deploying a two-pronged
approach, which addresses both security and
development issues.
3.1.1 Strategies against security threats
Territorial administrative division 
Mali’s regions are the administrative
responsibility of governors, administrative areas
are governed by prefects and urban districts are
led by sub-prefects. Decentralised entities are
governed by regional assemblies, area councils
and district councils. District councillors are
chosen through universal direct suffrage, and
area and regional councillors through indirect
suffrage. Leaders of fractions, villages, and urban
districts work with local authorities. They are
freely elected according to community customs,
for life, except in cases of grave misconduct. The
Malian state allows for the development and self-
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fulfilment of communities and local authorities
on the condition that they subscribe to principles
of the rule of law, national unity, and territorial
integrity. The fragmentation of decision-making
centres at local level has, however, reduced the
role and moral influence of customary chiefs,
chiefs of fractions and villages (Moussa 2005),
reflecting the government’s unease about their
power. However, as one chef de fraction from the
Kidal region noted: 
Sidelining traditional chieftaincies has had [a
negative] impact on conflict resolution in the
north. Contrary to the former regime’s
practice of heavily involving chiefs of fractions
and communities in the resolution of the
crisis... during the 1990s, the current
authorities prefer using the services of former
rebel leaders (interview, Kidal, 16 May 2011).
The deployment of armed forces in the north of Mali
In addition to its decentralised administrative
authority, the state makes its presence felt
through the deployment of security forces. The
territorial distribution of security forces in the
north is as follows:15
z Armed forces: there are an estimated 2,000
soldiers in the Gao region, 1,500 in Kidal and
1,700 in Timbuktu.
z The National Guard: the National Guard is a
branch of the army entrusted with national
security. One of its particularities is the
creation of the specialised Meharist unit,
which carries out operations on camel-back.
Successors of the nomadic guard, Meharist
units were incorporated into the National
Guard in 1995, with the support of the French
Cooperation, to cope with the lack of resources
needed to control the vast desert areas. Many
former Tuareg rebel fighters joined the
Meharist units, after the peace accords. The
National Guard has 400 soldiers in Gao, 350 in
Kidal, and 450 in the Timbuktu region. 
z The national gendarmerie: has 275 officers in
the Gao region, 150 in the Kidal region, and
250 in the Timbuktu region.
z The national police: there are 79 officers in
the Gao region, 46 in the Kidal region, and 27
in Timbuktu.
The relatively weak presence of armed and
security forces in Northern Mali, reflected by low
deployment numbers, is at odds with Malian
authorities’ desire to curb insecurity in the
region. Arguably, the situation is due to the
various peace negotiations with rebel movements,
who demanded reduced military presence in the
north. The governor of Kidal also underlined the
fact that security personnel assigned to the
region rarely take up their posts because of the
difficult geographic and climatic conditions. 
Legislative instruments
In July 2008, Mali adopted law no. 08-025,
pertaining to the prevention of terrorist acts,
comparable to laws adopted by the Council of
Europe and the European Union. It criminalises
acts which can lead to the perpetration of
terrorist offences such as public provocation,
incitement to commit terrorist acts and terrorist
recruitment. This law is in line with the United
Nations’ global anti-terrorism strategy. 
Moreover, the government has introduced an
integrated programme against drugs trafficking
and organised crime. New anti-crime structures
including Pôles économiques and the Office National de
Répression du Trafic de Drogue et de Stupéfiants have
been created. The programme is supported by
bilateral donors, including Denmark, Luxembourg,
Austria and Italy, through the United Nations
Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
The effectiveness of the fight against terrorist
and criminal networks depends on close
cooperation with other states in the region.
Important differences in preferred strategies
prevail, however. For instance, there is no
transnational consensus on the issue of ransom
payments. Algeria has always adopted a hard-line
policy and refuses to negotiate with terrorists,
and has always regarded Mali’s willingness to do
so as lax. Mauritania and Niger hold the same
stance as Algeria. In contrast, Malian authorities
have chosen to place emphasis on the lives of
hostages. The Malian state has sought to avoid
confrontation with terrorist groups based on an
official belief that the country has never been the
target of terrorists. This attitude has earned the
government much criticism from its neighbours,
especially Algeria.
However, a change in Mali’s anti-terrorism
strategy appears to be underway. Since the
appointment of a new head of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation,
Mali is beginning to show some interest in
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cooperating with its neighbours and refusing to
give in to AQIM’s demands following recent
kidnappings in Niger, where France opted for a
military option to free hostages. This approach
was unsuccessful, however: two French hostages
were killed and AQIM managed to escape with
the remaining hostages and disappeared in the
Malian desert (Diarra, B.S. 2011; Charlet 2011;
Diarra, A. 2011). 
In the thrust towards this new policy stance, army
chiefs from Mali, Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger
met in Bamako on 29 April 2011 under the
auspices of the new Minister for Foreign Affairs.
This resulted in the creation of a joint operational
committee (Comité d’Etat Major Opérationnel Conjoint
– CEOC) to coordinate combined anti-terrorism
military operations. For instance, since June 2011,
the Malian army and its Mauritanian counterpart
have cooperated in a new offensive against AQIM
positions on their mutual border. 
3.1.2 Development policy for Northern Mali 
The Malian government’s development policy
framework for the northern regions is based on
awareness-raising and supporting local
communities to meet their basic needs and
access basic social services, strengthening small
arms return programmes and fighting against
their proliferation.16
The main strategic directions of the security and
anti-terrorism programme in Northern Mali are
integrated into two local development
programmes: The Emergency Programme for
Security and Anti-terrorism in the North of Mali
(Programme d’Urgence pour la Réduction de l’Insécurité
et la lutte contre le Terrorisme dans le Nord-Mali –
PIRIN 2010–2012) and the Special Programme
for Peace, Security and Development in the
North (Programme Spécial pour la Paix, la Sécurité et
le Développement dans le Nord – PSPSDN), created
in 2010. PIRIN aims to eliminate the causes of
insecurity in Northern Mali. The action plan
focuses on the construction or renovation of
barracks, the establishment of new security
outposts, gendarmerie brigades and police stations,
and infrastructure development (health centres,
schools, boreholes, administrative offices, and
tied accommodations). Particular emphasis is
being placed on the development of the penal
system, communication, and demilitarisation
through the return of small arms. The PSPSDN
has five dimensions: security, communications,
governance, development, and management. The
two programmes are complementary, although
the PIRIN is more geared towards securitisation
and the PSPSDN is mainly focused on local
communities. 
3.2 International responses 
The presence of AQIM in the Sahel represents a
global threat against which international partners
are helping Mali to fight. International responses
have consisted of the adoption of multilateral
legal instruments, and the promotion of
development and anti-terrorism policies which
seek to strengthen states’ operational capacity.
3.2.1 International legal instruments against terrorism 
There are at least 16 international conventions
that can be classed as global anti-terrorism
instruments (see UNODC 2009). Regional
prevention and suppression instruments have
also been signed at regional level, mainly the
Convention of the African Union (AU) on the
prevention and fight against terrorism, adopted
at Addis Ababa on 8 July 2004.
Africa counts two main terrorist groups affiliated
to Al Qaeda: AQIM in the Sahel and Al Shabab
and Aalamia in the East. The African Union has
called for a prohibition of ransom payments to
terrorist groups, the elaboration of an Africa-
specific law on terrorism and the nomination of
an AU Special Representative to coordinate anti-
terrorism programmes. An African Centre for
Study and Research on Terrorism has been
established to stand as the central point for
information, research and analysis. 
At the sub-regional level, the West African
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) has
strongly committed to suppressing terrorism in its
eight member states. It has adopted a number of
pertinent measures such as Regulation No.
14\2002\CM\WAEMU related to the freezing of
funds and other financial resources and Guideline
No. 04|2007|CM|WAEMU related to the fight
against terrorist financing in its member states.
Further, the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) has begun to elaborate
on a regional framework. ECOWAS seeks to
provide the region with monitoring, intelligence
gathering, analysis and dissemination capacities,
and to fight against the presence and
development of terrorist activity in West Africa
(UN 2010a; Ipe, Cockayne and Millar 2010).
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3.2.2 Military and development cooperation 
AQIM tends to attack Western interests,
including business operations and diplomats, and
has declared war on political leaders of countries
in the region accused of corruption and allegiance
with the West (and the USA in particular).
Individuals are also targeted by the Jihadists. 
Algeria, which sees itself as the regional leader in
the fight against terrorism in the Sahel, prefers
partnership between Sahelian states, to Western
intervention. This, according to Algiers, is to
avoid turning the Sahel into another Afghanistan.
Accordingly, the (unsuccessful) 2010 Franco-
Mauritanian intervention in Mali, wherein a
commando of French Special Forces accompanied
the Mauritanian army on a mission to free a
French hostage from Al Qaeda, was not well
received by Algeria. To avoid such future
interventions, Algeria is encouraging
coordination of intelligence services and the
establishment of a common operations command. 
The USA has supported Mali by providing training
to local forces. Since 2002, Americans have helped
develop the Pan-Sahel Initiative, which became the
Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative
(TSCTI) in 2005. This plan aims to support the
seven countries which border the Sahara in their
fight against terrorism, under the direction of the
United States Africa Command (AFRICOM),
based in Stuttgart (Germany). 
France also supports Mali’s fight against
terrorism and drugs trafficking, mainly through
its diplomatic representation, the delegation of
the Home Security Service (Délégation du Service
de la Sécurité Intérieure – SSI), and the Mission for
Military and Defence Cooperation (Mission de
Coopération Militaire et de Défense – MCMD). The
SSI provides training and logistical support to
national security (police, gendarmerie, civil
security) and customs services. Training is
related to drugs trafficking, document fraud,
public order, forensics, and police intelligence.
SSI also implements long-term programmes
aimed at supporting Malian services in the fight
against organised crime. 
MCMD is composed of ten advisors and
instructors deployed to various branches of the
army. Its activities include providing equipment
to the National Guard, technical and logistical
support and organisational training. 
The European Union is also an important actor
and has developed multifaceted partnerships with
countries of the Sahel. Its three principles of
intervention relate to: threats to the EU’s
internal security (illegal immigration, drugs
trafficking, and terrorism); protection of national
and European investments; and supporting
countries in the region to achieve the Millennium
Development Goals. Three principles for action
follow: ideological decontamination;
demilitarisation of anti-terrorist strategies; and
the decompartmentalisation of actions and
initiatives.
The UN is also involved in this fight against
organised crime and terrorism in the Sahel. The
Governance, Peace, and Security Programme is a
joint initiative of the government of Mali and the
United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), with financial support from
Switzerland and Luxembourg. An important
aspect of this programme is the establishment of
a community police force in the northern regions
of Mali. The basic premise of the programme,
according to its coordinator, Zéini Moulaye, is
based on the principle of alternative policing. It
seeks to allow local communities to take charge
of their own security. It consists of deploying
community police in each district. It also
provides a role for customary and traditional
authorities in security provision. It prioritises
community involvement in the form of
neighbourhood watch brigades and ensuring
local access to information and communication,
including translating administrative and legal
documents into local languages and meetings
between authorities, local representatives,
security and armed forces and local communities
(Moussa 2005; Ministère de la Sécurité Intérieure et de
la Protection Civile 2005). 
Alternative security seeks to bring together
various stakeholders in the security domain
(public authorities, civil society, the private
sector, local representatives, local communities,
and technical and financial partners). However,
while Malian actors have adopted this concept in
principle, it has yet to be fully implemented.
4 Local communities and security threats
Local communities, traditional leaders, opinion
leaders, religious leaders, and local civil society
organisations are all involved in responding to
criminal and terrorist threats in Northern Mali.
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Residual insecurity threatens traditional ways of
life for communities who depend essentially on
cattle-rearing and trading across the Sahara. 
4.1 Impact of criminal threats and perceptions of local
communities 
Communities living in Northern Mali are
considered to be both the victims of the army’s
efforts to track down criminals and terrorists, and
accomplices of rebellions, trafficking and Islamic
terrorist activity. The way local communities
perceive these threats is ambiguous, and can
influence local responses to the security issue. 
4.1.1 The impact of security threats on local
communities
The social cohesion and the livelihoods of local
communities in Northern Mali are greatly
affected by recurrent security threats. This
chronic insecurity impacts severely on tourism,
the local crafts industry and cattle-rearing.
Attacks perpetrated against aid workers and
vehicle thefts keep tourists away. Businesses
involved in the tourism industry (travel agents,
hotels, vehicle hire companies, etc.) and local
craftsmen are struggling to pay their employees,
taxes and loans. Tradespeople suffer. Investments
in the tourism sector have decreased and
development projects have been halted. 
Tensions arising from the disputes over the use
of grazing pastures, cattle thefts and army
incursions have severely impacted cattle-rearing.
Cattle farmers are increasingly moving towards
the south of Mali (to the regions of Mopti, Ségou
and Sikasso for example). The proliferation of
weapons has heightened insecurity and forced
many people to move to cities, where they
struggle to find work.
Others, including the Tuaregs, increasingly
engage in illegal activity. The dividends of
criminal activities (terrorism and drug
trafficking) create tensions between communities
in the North, most notably between the Tuaregs
and the Arabs, and the Sonrhaï and the nomads.
In order to consolidate their position, terrorists
and criminals co-opt local communities and
fractions by involving them in their activities.
Local tribes profit greatly from their involvement,
making it extremely difficult and challenging to
control criminal and terrorist movements.
Terrorist groups use many young Tuaregs and
Arabs as informants. Traffickers also exploit
young people’s knowledge of the terrain. Some
young Tuaregs are armed and act as couriers,
earning considerable amounts. For example, a
courier transporting drugs from Kidal to Agadès
in Niger can make a few million CFA (Communauté
de Francs Africain).17 Until recently, young people
restricted themselves to transporting the drugs,
but traditional leaders are increasingly reporting
drug use among young people in their community.
Some local representatives are also reportedly
being co-opted by drug traffickers. 
Similarly, young people are prey to terrorist
networks and religious fundamentalist groups.
AQIM groups recruit local fighters by offering
them money, while other groups brainwash
youngsters into joining their ranks. American
and European army officials have always feared
the mutation of pious Muslims into
fundamentalist groups in the north of Mali. One
example of this transformation is the Dawa
group, which was created in the then-Indian
province of Dhaka in the 1930s. The group’s
preachers, mainly Pakistanis and Bengalis,
spread their vision of Islam in Mali and
neighbouring states.18 Its members belong to the
popular Muslim movement Jama’at Tabligh and
spend one year travelling to preach the
principles of their movement. Their teachings
have sown the seeds of a much more virulent and
radical form of Islam in Mali. The Dawa group
has even been linked to the GSPC (International
Crisis Group 2005). 
4.1.2 Ambivalent local perceptions 
Populations in Northern Mali have mixed
perceptions of terrorist and criminal threats. For
most people, particularly in the Kidal region, the
presence of ‘so-called terrorists’ is not a threat.
One elected local representative remarked: 
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is not a
jackal that is going to eat our cattle. AQIM
does not threaten the population in any way.
This means that communities don’t see the
need to protect themselves. However,
communities do tend to protect development
projects such as schools, madrasas, solar power
stations, health centres, etc. People aspire to
development and security. Nomads will get
involved to protect these gains, and this is how
we can prevent the recruitment of our young
people by AQIM (interview, Timbuktu, 10
May 2011). 
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But he also insists on the fact that ‘Many nomads
think that AQIM and fraud are legal activities. If
you ask a nomad, he will tell you that he’s a
trafficker, fraudster or even a member of AQIM.
For him, a trafficker is a tradesman’ (ibid.). 
For certain population groups, particularly the
Tuareg community in Kidal, AQIM members are
not terrorists. According to one fraction chief,
‘AQIM is a force to be reckoned with in the
region. They have money and they invest in
projects such as building wells and providing
healthcare to nomadic communities’ (interview,
Kidal, 16 May 2011). Army incursions, on the
other hand, are often badly perceived. If the
army intervenes to address an issue that affects
the local community, such as weeding out armed
bandits, then they are assisted by the local
population. However, if the army acts to suppress
trafficking and other illicit activity, then they
become real enemies. 
4.2 The response of non-state actors 
In order to curb various threats, non-state actors
rely on traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms.
Further, the state calls upon these non-state
actors to support the securitisation process in the
region via a participatory governance approach.
4.2.1 The mobilisation of traditional conflict-resolution
mechanisms
Sahelian communities, particularly the Tuareg,
tend to be hierarchical, unequal and
confrontational. Intercommunity rivalries
exacerbate these inherent tensions. To overcome
these challenges, communities have developed
mechanisms and procedures to help prevent and
resolve conflicts. 
Traditions and customs play an important role in
managing and resolving intercommunity
conflicts. Konaté (2001) notes that many social
practices and traditions across the region have
contributed to and continue to play a part in
maintaining social order today. Indeed, many
communities across the region extol the virtues
of tolerance and non-violence, as demonstrated
by the expressions bamanan de sabali (invitation to
moderation), bèn (harmony) and niongo gasi sigui
(respecting others) commonly used in proverbs,
songs and other stories. Peace building in these
communities rests on the prevention of conflicts
through social regulation and diplomacy. In most
West African tribal societies, clans are interlinked
through a system of solidarity and alliances that
is key to social cohesion, and based on marriages
between members of different clans, and the
movement of cattle (akh idarren, inuf, tiyaten…) ;
Sanakouya (‘alliance à plaisanterie’ in French, a
system of common values amongst different
clans/communities in Southern Mali based on
good humour); Arkawel (being true to your word),
Taboubicha (cousinage in French, or joking kinship);
Achekk (respecting those weaker than yourself).
These alliances between clans cement blood ties
that reduce the risks of open conflict. 
Communities in Northern Mali adopt similar
traditional methods of conflict resolution, which
are also based on the principles of Islam (prayers,
Ramadan, Zakat), Sharia law (Koranic law and
Hadiths from the Prophet Mohammed), and
agreements. Community leaders, marabouts, and
other wise men come together to resolve conflicts
in a peaceful manner under the auspices of Islam,
often presided over by the Cadi (leader of prayers
and religious ceremonies, who applies Sharia if
necessary). The Cadi is supported in his decision-
making by traditional leaders and chiefs. Their
moral authority contributes to the finality of
decisions. For the Songhaïs, the marabout also
plays the roles of Imam, judge, Cadi, professor,
secretary and advisor. He is at the centre of
conflict-resolution initiatives. 
Local initiatives have started to emerge to
educate communities about the various threats.
Intercommunity meetings have been organised to
raise people’s awareness and to attempt to re-
establish stability. These community leaders used
the values of equality, solidarity, mutual help and
understanding extolled by Islam to persuade
opposing parties to seek peace and reconciliation.
Examples of this include la rencontre de junhan, a
local initiative to address the Tuareg issue in
1997, organised after the 1996 peace treaty, and
efforts to mediate between the self-defence group
Gandakoi and the Sonrhaïs in the north.
Religious leaders have also intervened to resolve
intercommunity conflicts, such as between the
Arabs and Kountas in the Gao region. 
In order to respond to terrorist threats in the
north, the Malian government is now asking
customary chiefs and leaders for their support.
They are involved in hostage negotiations and are
key spokespersons for the government in these
discussions. However, when substantial ransoms
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are involved, community leaders tend to be
superseded by former rebel leaders from the
1990s. The former rebels are closely linked to
former Algerian GSPC members, who have now
joined AQIM. Although their objectives were
different, both groups used the desert as their base
and were operational in the 1990s when the GSPC
was fighting against the Algerian government and
the Tuaregs the Malian government. 
Notwithstanding the existence of community-
based conflict-resolution mechanisms, the
insecurity issue jeopardises the very foundations
of intercommunity solidarity. The Tuaregs hold
the Arabs in general and the Kountas in
particular responsible for drug trafficking,
cigarette smuggling and car thefts in the region,
while the Tuaregs are mostly responsible for the
rebellious uprising. The Arabs are also thought
to provide shelter to AQIM fighters. Both sides
often seek revenge if a member of their
community gets killed. 
4.2.2 The emergence of new networks: a form of
participatory governance? 
The engagement of local communities in the
northern regions (including parliamentarians,
local elected representatives, fraction leaders,
opinion leaders and senior executives) in
implementing government policies is key to the
region’s response to its security issues. Various
networks are involved in a multilevel governance
framework aiming to build peace and bring
security to the region. Most community leaders
realise the seriousness of the threat for the
entire sub-region, which exacerbates existing
intercommunity tensions. For network leaders,
AQIM are real terrorists who can strike
anywhere at any time, including in Bamako.
Today, stakeholders involved in the response to
security threats are organised and have
developed networks of local leaders, state
representatives and newly created local NGOs.
An intercommunity meeting on peace and
security in Northern Mali organised in Kidal in
October 2009 brought together 1,432
participants from the three northern regions and
Bamako. Participants included local elected
representatives: national advisors, regional
assembly presidents, mayors and municipal
advisors; central government representatives in
the regions: governors, prefects and sub-prefects;
and customary leaders: local dignitaries, fraction
chiefs and other local leaders. Every community
in Northern Mali was represented, as well as the
President of the 2006 Alger Agreement
Monitoring Committee, the Directors of the
Northern Development Agency and the National
Investment Agency for Local Authorities, and
Libyan and Algerian diplomats. 
The forum led to the establishment of the
Northern Mali Network for Peace and Security,
supported by the European Union, which brings
together individuals from different communities,
fractions and professions. The Network is now
the main point of contact for the Malian
authorities and international partners. It acts as
an interface between the government, local
authorities, international partners and local
communities. Since its inception, more than 360
fractions and villages have joined the network
and a provisional secretariat has been set up,
made up of 45 members. The Network’s external
partners are the Swiss Embassy in Bamako, the
European Union and UNDP via the Shared
Governance, Security and Peace Programme. 
Further, a dynamic civil society is developing in
Northern Mali, working to improve social
cohesion, peace, and the rule of law. It comprises
women’s associations, youth organisations,
associations of religious leaders and traditional
chieftaincies. Civil society in Northern Mali is
heavily involved in awareness-raising and
education, particularly amongst nomadic
communities. International NGOs are also
present in the region.
5 Conclusion
The security situation in Northern Mali appears
to be improving with the involvement of local
communities in processes of conflict-
management and the increased role of
community networks, as well as the
establishment of a community police force. The
lack of means, combined with a weak security
apparatus (police, gendarmerie, customs, and legal
system), still constitute a major obstacle in the
fight against these multiple threats, however.
Some young people are distributing propaganda
material, asking for the creation of a Tuareg
state in the north of the country. Criminal
activities such as drugs, weapons and cigarette
trafficking continue to thrive. Elements of AQIM
and other armed groups continue to operate
from their Malian bases. 
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Compounding these problems, armed groups
have also taken advantage of the turmoil in
Libya to acquire more weapons, ammunition,
and state-of-the-art equipment in order to carry
out their criminal activities and impose their
hegemony in the region. 
The 17 January 2012 rebellion, launched by le
Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawade
(MNLA – the National Liberation Movement of
the Azawade), is a logical extension of the
existing tensions in Northern Mali. The arrival
of Malian combatants from Libya has
accelerated events but all the ingredients of the
rebellion have been evident for some time. The
Malian government is now confronted with three
problems: mass population displacement and the
movement of refugees to neighbouring countries;
upcoming elections (both presidential and a
referendum on the new constitution); and a
rapidly evolving military situation on the ground.
The resolution of this new rebellion remains
political. A military option, while potentially
restoring calm, should not be viewed as the
ultimate means of restoring peace to the region.
Dialogue remains the most appropriate solution
and there has been a discrete intervention from
Malian civil society to restore peace in Northern
Mali through mediation.
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Notes
* This article was approved by the author on
20 March 2012 and therefore takes no account
of the politically destabilising events that took
place subsequently in Mali.
§ Based on a paper translated from the French
original by Marie-Anne Diedhiou-Roy.
1 1962–1964, 1990, 1994–1995 and 2006. 
2 The drought of 1973 killed between 50,000
and 100,000 people. It caused a substantial
decrease in production. Nomadic pastoralist
groups such as the Tuareg lost almost half of
their cattle. 
3 Branch of the army with responsibility for law
enforcement.
4 These fractions are administrative units.
While urban districts in Mali are made up of
area districts called quartiers, rural districts are
made up of villages (in fixed settlements) or
fractions (in nomadic areas). Each fraction is
headed by a locally elected chief called chef de
fraction, who plays the role of intermediary
between the community and the state.
5 Sonrhaïs, Songhoys, Songhaïs are variations of
the spelling.
6 Given the difficulties related to getting hold
of reliable figures, we had to settle for data
provided in the article, ‘Population du Mali’
(UN 2010b). 
7 A significant factor of arms proliferation is
their relative low cost. A Department for
International Development (DFID) study on
the causes of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa,
noted, ‘Everywhere in Africa, the usual price
of the ever-present assault rifle AK 47
remains stable at 25 dollars’ (DFID 2001: 15).
8 On 5 November 2009 a Boeing 727 from
Venezuela, likely loaded with cocaine, was found
burnt on a makeshift runway in the desert in
Gao region. In December 2009 Malian Police
arrested a Spanish, a Portuguese and a
Venezuelan man, who were suspected of
involvement in the so-called ‘Boeing de la Coke’.
The suspects turned out to be closely linked to
Mohamed Ould Didi, who was arrested in
Mauritania in the same case (Peduzzi 2010).
9 Iyad Ag Aghali is the former leader of the
rebellions of 1994 and 1995. He was the leader
of the Alliance Démocratique du 23 mai pour le
Changement, alongside Hassan Fagaga and
Ibrahim Ag Bahanga. He is currently the
Malian consul in Djeddah, Saudi Arabia.
10 Edgar Pisani, then Director of the Arab
Institute, was not the French envoy. His
mediation had been individually solicited by
the Malian authorities.
11 Young Tuaregs called ishumar, are mainly
unemployed youth who migrated to Libya
from Northern Mali following the droughts of
1973 and 1984, as well as those who left to
escape state repression of the 1962 rebellion.
12 Amri Saifi, also known as Abderazak El Para,
was the leader of GSPC. He was arrested on
16 March in Tibesti by elements of the
Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad
(MDJT), a rebel movement against the
authority of Ndjamena, Chad. 
13 All community leaders were categorical on
this aspect during our different interviews
both in the north and in Bamako.
14 Interview with Alain Antil in the Malian daily
Le Républicain, 6 July 2011.
15 Information obtained from documents
obtained from the Gao Governorate and the
national police in Bamako (2011), and
supplemented by Kornio and Kebe (2008). 
16 Interview with Moctar Ouane, former
minister of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation of Mali in the daily L’indépendant
of 28 September 2010.
17 Currency usable in Mali and in eight
countries of West Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso,
Côte I’voire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger,
Senegal and Togo.
18 They chose Northern Mali because of the
widespread and long-standing tradition of
marabouts, particularly in Timbuktu.
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